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Abstract
It has often been claimed in contemporary philosophy that the scientific world-view 
will necessarily replace the view of the world provided by common sense. It may be 
argued, however, that common sense holds a sort of methodological primacy over the 
aforementioned scientific world-view. For example, the thesis of the indeterminacy of 
radical translation entails the impossibility of establishing what a scientific theory is 
talking about. We can say what a scientific theory deals with only by having recourse 
to our ordinary language, i.e., by assuming that we know and understand in advance 
what we are talking about normally, in our daily life. It follows that science cannot be 
conceived of as a form of knowledge which is totally independent of ordinary language 
and, therefore, alternative to it. According to such a stance, even scientific theories 
stem from the universe of meanings that belong to common language.
On his part Davidson, in challenging the scheme-content dualism, mentions both “a 
dualism of total scheme (or language) and uninterpreted content”, and “a dualism of 
conceptual scheme and empirical content”.1 What we have here is a real dichotomy 
between these two elements, in the sense that the (conceptual) scheme is “other 
than” the (non-conceptual) content that is opposed to it. Now, Davidson’s rejection of 
the scheme-content distinction is supported by a set of arguments purporting to reject, 
first of all, the thesis that totally different conceptual schemes can actually exist. To put 
things in a very sketchy manner, he equates having a conceptual scheme with having a 
language, so that we face the following elements: (1) language as the organizing force; 
(2) what is organized, referred to as “experience”, “the stream of sensory experience”, 
and “physical evidence”; and, finally, (3) the failure of intertranslatability. It follows 
that “It is essential to this idea that there be something neutral and common that 
lies outside all schemes”.2 If this is the situation, he goes on, then we could say that 
conceptual schemes that are different in a radical way from each other correspond 
to languages that are not intertranslatable. How can we, however, make sense of a 
total failure of intertranslatability among languages? For sure “we could not be in 
a position to judge that others had concepts or beliefs radically different from our 
own”.3 Davidson’s conclusion is that if one gives up the dualism of scheme and world, 
1 D. Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1985, pp. 183-98.
2 Ibid., pp. 190-1.
3 Ibid., p. 197.
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he will not give up the world, but will instead be able to “re-establish unmediated 
touch with the familiar objects whose antics make our sentences and opinions true”.4
Davidson’s solution is radical, but we are bound to ask at this point what the expressions 
“reality” and “world” mean for him. They seem to coincide with the world of common 
sense which is formed by the familiar objects whose antics - as he says - make our 
sentences and opinions true or false. These familiar objects are tables, chairs, houses, 
stars, etc., just as we perceive them in our daily life. One is not entitled to ignore, 
however, that the current discussions on the problem of scientific realism arise because 
there appears to be a strong asymmetry between the commonsense view of the world 
and the scientific one. For instance, the table that we see with our eyes is not the 
same table that we “see” through the mediation of scientific instruments, and this fact 
is not trivial. It is rather easy to reach a high level of inter-subjective agreement among 
the individuals present in a room about the color, size and weight of a table, and it 
can also be granted that we form our beliefs in this regard by triangulating with our 
interlocutors and the surrounding environment. Such an agreement, however, may 
turn out to be problematic when we try to reconcile this vision of the world with what 
today science tells us about it.
So, being in touch with such familiar objects as tables, chairs and stars “all the time” 
- as Richard Rorty adds - has a fundamental bearing only on the ontology of common 
sense, since our actual science shows that quite a different representation of reality 
can actually be provided (or, even better, it shows that those objects might not exist as 
men perceive them). Naturally, one can always resort to an objection of the following 
kind: Why should we deem the table viewed as a collection of subatomic particles 
more important than the table that our eyes see in daily life? After all, we can conduct 
our life well enough even ignoring what science claims (just like men did for many 
thousand years). This, however, may be judged as a serious underevaluation of the 
scientific enterprise. As a matter of fact, in the last centuries we are confronted not by 
one world-view, but by two complex images, each of which means to be a complete 
picture of man in the world. Wilfrid Sellars called these two perspectives, respectively, 
the manifest and the scientific image of man in the world.5
They are both intersubjective and non arbitrary. What are, however, these two images, 
and are they really alternative? Let us note, from the onset, that the two images we 
just mentioned are both idealizations in the same sense of Max Weber’s “ideal types”. 
This means that, in order to discover their actual presence, we need having recourse 
to a good deal of philosophical abstraction. In other words, they are not disclosed 
by mere empirical recognition. For instance, we live in the commonsense view of 
4 Ibid., p. 198.
5 W. Sellars, “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man”, in Science, Perception and Reality, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London-
New York, 1963, p. 1-40.
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the world, and only a complex process of reflection makes us understand that we, as 
human beings, share a common view of the world, which is in turn determined by the 
fact that our physical structure bounds us to conceive of reality in a certain way rather 
than in another. Think about the importance that light, for example, has not only in 
daily life, but even in our philosophical conceptualization of the world. The story is 
complicated by the fact that each image has a history, and while the manifest image 
dates back to pre-history, the scientific image is constantly changing shape.
Keywords: science; language; common sense; scientific image; manifest image.
Introduction
The following is the Sellarsian description of the manifest image: “The manifest image 
of man-in-the-world can be characterized in two ways, which are supplementary 
rather than alternative. It is, first, the framework in terms of which man came to be 
aware of himself as man-in-the-world. It is the framework in terms of which, to use 
an existentialist turn of phrase, man first encountered himself - which is, of course, 
when he came to be man. For it is no merely incidental feature of man that he has a 
conception of himself as man-in-the-world, just as it is obvious, on reflection, that if 
man had a radically different conception of himself he would be a radically different 
kind of man”.6
This characterization is important for our purposes. It entails, in fact, that a replacement 
of the commonsense image of the world would lead us to see ourselves in quite a 
different manner and, obviously, it may be asked to what extent this can actually 
occur. If man could not be man until he encountered himself, what we said above 
implies that this encounter (which is a socially shared one) took place in the manifest 
image. Switching to another image means that the aforementioned encounter should 
be re-worked from the start. But we also know that conceptual thinking is deeply 
entrenched in the manifest image. Since the ability to think is nothing but judging 
thoughts by standards of correctness and relevance, it should be noted that these 
standards, in turn, are relative to the manifest image, and their replacement is no easy 
task. On the other hand the manifest image is no naive conception, since it may be 
characterized as a refinement of a more primitive image which was gradually replaced 
during the cultural evolution of mankind. In this sense, the conceptual framework of 
the manifest image is, itself, a kind of scientific image. Sellars noted that “There is, 
however, one type of scientific reasoning which it, by stipulation, does not include, 
namely that which involves the postulation of imperceptible entities, and principles 
pertaining to them, to explain the behavior of perceptible things”.7
6 W. Sellars, ibid., p. 6.
7 W. Sellars, ibid., p. 7.
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We can say, at this point, that in our daily life the manifest image dominates the 
scientific one, and this entails quite important consequences. The philosophical vision 
of man in the world appears to someone to be distorted because of this fact, since 
man is essentially a being which conceives of himself in terms of the manifest image. 
If so, one is bound to conclude that man’s conception of himself in the world does 
not easily accommodate the other image (the scientific one). The picture of man in 
the world that the scientific image provides us with seems to be at odds with the one 
provided by the manifest image, in the sense that there is tension between them. If 
the scientific image is correct, then man is not the sort of being he conceives himself 
to be, in the sense that his whole existence appears to be based on error. Sellars even 
notes that this is no novelty in the history of philosophy: “One thinks, for example, 
of Spinoza, who contrasted man as he falsely conceives himself to be with man as he 
discovers himself to be in the scientific enterprise. It might well be said that Spinoza 
drew a distinction between a “manifest” and a “scientific” image of man, rejecting the 
former as false and accepting the latter as true”.8
If we recall that to ask what are the basic objects of a framework is to ask for a 
classification (and not for a simple list), it should be obvious to anyone that the basic 
objects of the manifest image are all kinds of living beings and all kinds of material 
things. But the manifest image itself is no “external” standard either, because it has an 
objective existence which transcends the personal opinions of individual thinkers. This 
means that in the manifest image we find truth and error, although the possibility is 
open that such image might have to be rejected, in the last analysis, as false. In other 
words, we can evaluate the correctness or incorrectness of the description provided 
by the manifest image by having recourse to well-established standards. If so, the fact 
that human beings are what they are because they think of themselves in terms of 
the manifest image, leads one to ask to what extent the manifest image of man can 
survive in a picture where the scientific image, which grew up in the last centuries, 
becomes the dominant element.
Furthermore, it looks plausible to think that the manifest image echoes, in a more 
or less adequate way, the intelligible structure of the world. Notice that we said 
the “intelligible” structure of the world, and not the structure of the world as such. 
There is, obviously, a great difference between these two expressions: The adjective 
“intelligible” makes the difference. However, we can say, at most, that our ordinary 
language mirrors the manifest image. This image includes not only commonsense 
objects, but also theories, beliefs, etc. It is an interpretative device, rather than a 
faithful and mechanical reproduction of what our senses perceive. Sensory data have 
meaning only within a theoretical framework. To say “This is a table” means already to 
classify. Nothing, in sensory stimulations, tells us that “this” is a table, which has some 
8 W. Sellars, ibid., p. 8.
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characteristic in common with all the objects of the same kind. It is the social (inter-
subjective) dimension that counts. Even if the manifest image were false, then, there 
is thruth and error within it: it is objective. But this kind of objectivity is objectivity-
for-us.
Ordinary language, thus, mirrors the manifest image at large. Obviously this fact 
is very important but, on the other hand, it does not authorize to claim - as some 
analytic philosophers today do - that language mirrors the world, so that the analysis 
of language would allow us to build some kind of absolute ontology. Were this be 
true, Micheal Dummett would be right in claiming that the philosophy of language 
replaced metaphysics, thus becoming the new “first philosophy”.9 We cannot say 
this because the manifest image is not the world. The importance of common sense 
cannot be denied: It is the main instrument we have at our disposal for interacting 
with the environment. Our natural language reflects the world of common sense, and 
this is perfectly obvious. But natural language is silent when dealing with quantum 
phenomena. Only someone believing in the equation “natural language = absolute 
ontology” may believe this.
According to this picture language is the best way at our disposal for getting a 
comprehensive view of reality. But one must be very careful in evaluating remarks 
like these. If they mean to tell us that the picture of the world inferred from language 
is the picture by which we organize our life and through which we get in touch with 
the world, no sound objection arises. But if they mean to convey the impression that 
this very picture and the world at large are one and the same thing (as Richard Rorty 
sometime seems to imply), and if we take this impression for granted, we shall indeed 
have great problems for specifying why, and how, today science provides us with a 
different kind of information. We should instead say that language makes manifest the 
large features of our reality. Naturally one can always try to build bridges between the 
commonsense image and the scientific one and, in the end, it may turn out that these 
bridges may - at least partially - be established. This move, however, needs a complex 
and patient work of analysis and exploration, a work that one does not find in the 
writings of those authors who endorse the stance mentioned above.
The manifest image
What, then, about the problem of the relations between thought and the world? 
On the one side the constituents of thinking are believed to be at least qualitatively 
similar to the basic constituents of the world, while, on the other, the world is 
believed to be the cause of the events taking place in the mind (or, to put it in a 
different way, the events in the mind are supposed to echo the events occurring in 
9 See M. Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language, Duckworth, London, 1973, and M. Dummett, The Logical Basis of 
Metaphysics, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1991.
M. Marsonet - science and different iMages of the World     105
the world). However, associating thoughts is different from associating images, in the 
sense that a “framework of conceptual thinking” is presupposed anyhow. And this 
makes us understand an important fact: The action of the world on the individuals can 
explain connections of the associative kind, but not the rational connections of which 
conceptual thinking is made. Obviously this does not mean to deny that the world 
really is the cause of the individual’s image of the world. Philosophy has insisted for 
centuries on the causal action of the world - conceived of as “intelligible” world - on 
the mind. But the causal role that nature plays with reference to conceptual thinking 
cannot be equated with a conditioning of the individual by his natural environment 
without the mediation of social and community standards. The role of the group as a 
mediating factor in this causal connection is indeed essential.
If we conceive experience as the stimulation of sensory receptors - as Quine does - we 
rule out the possibility of rational links between experience itself and beliefs, while 
conceptual schemes may be viewed not just as piecemal beliefs, but rather as sets of 
logically interconnected beliefs. Sellars told us that the world of concepts is essentially 
formed by rational relations. In his most famous essay he claimed that when we 
describe the “states” that lead us to knowledge we not only describe them empirically, 
but also locate them in a logical space which has a rational character. And only within 
this logico-rational space are we able to justify what we say.10 The essentially social 
character of conceptual thinking comes clearly to mind when we recognize that 
thinking would be impossible in the absence of common standards of correctness 
and relevance, which relate what a particular individual thinks to what anyone ought 
to think. The contrast between the “I” of the individual and the “anyone” of the 
group is indispensable to rational thought. The representation of themselves that the 
individuals of a group hold is essential to the existence of the group: Communication 
embodies, so to speak, the essence of conceptual thinking. But it is likewise evident 
that only within the group can communication have meaning.
All this, in turn, means to seriously question the traditional image of the Self. The “I 
think” presupposes anyhow the presence of group criteria determining the meaning 
of the “I” in relation to others: Clear and distinct ideas do not exist in isolation. So, 
one is then bound to ask in what sense, if any, could the manifest image survive the 
attempt to replace it by an image of man as conceived in merely scientific terms. It is 
evident, in fact, that man conceived of in purely scientific terms is quite different from 
man as he conceives himself according to the standards of the manifest image.
The scientific image
As I noted previously, the scientific image of man is an idealization; it is difficult to 
define it in precise terms because it is constantly evolving. Moreover, it might objected 
10 W. Sellars, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” in Science, Perception and Reality, cit., p. 169.
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that the scientific images are more than one, in the sense that physics, chemistry, 
biology, sociology, etc. have, each, a particular image of man, and each of these 
images should, in turn, be confronted with the manifest one. Nevertheless, when we 
turn our attention to the scientific image which emerges from the several images of 
the different sciences, we find that it means to be a complete image which is supposed 
to contain the whole truth about the world. Just for this reason the scientific image 
may be thought of as a rival image. From the point of view of the supporters of the 
scientific image, the manifest one is totally inadequate, since “true” reality is mirrored 
in the scientific image. As we have just seen, the objection is that the scientific image 
cannot replace the manifest without challenging and rejecting its own foundations.
At this point it is important to note that any argument purporting to show that 
commonsense objects is what really exists, ruling out the existence of other kinds 
of objects, operates within the framework of common sense and, thus, provides us 
with no external point of view from which to support it. It is no help resorting to the 
notions of consistency and inconsistency, since a framework may be inconsistent and, 
yet, be a successful conceptual scheme in daily practice. Many problems arise when 
some authors - and Sellars among them - endorse the primacy of the scientific image. 
Sellars, for example, accepts the view that “the scientific account of the world is (in 
principle) the adequate image”11, so that “science is the measure of all things, of what 
is that it is, and of what is not that is not.”12
For sure there are many doubts about the possibility of construing such a scientific 
image (however idealized). The question in this regard is: Which scientific image are 
we talking or thinking about? A stable synthesis like the one envisioned above looks 
practically unachievable. One can endorse such a stance only if scientific research 
could come to a resting point, and it may be argued that we have no evidence that 
this is the case (or, even better, evidence goes in just the opposite direction). It should 
be noted, furthermore, that even the manifest image cannot be taken to be stable. As 
a matter of fact it evolves, bringing within its framework elements that come from the 
scientific image. The ontology of common sense is not stable and determined: It is not 
“given” once and forever. It continuously evolves by incorporating elements stemming 
from the scientific image.
A final remark is needed at this point. A picture like the one provided above makes 
sense only if science were something “neutral”, while it looks more reasonable to 
think of it as our science. Science always is the result of inquiry into nature, and this 
is inevitably a matter of transaction in which nature is one party and the inquirer is 
the other. Given this fact, science is not something altogether independent from the 
11 W. Sellars, “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man”, cit., p. 36.
12 W. Sellars, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” in Science, Perception and Reality, cit., p. 173.
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scientists which practice it and from their peculiar proceedings. Just for this reason we 
cannot accept the Protagorean statement that “science is the measure of all things.”
The notion of a “final theory”
Let us note now that science does not merely purport to produce theories, but it 
develops them for practical reasons: People are supposed to use those theories. The 
logic of explanation might come to a resting point only if science were able to attain 
completion. In the completed science (or “final theory”), in fact, men no longer need 
to inquire into the nature of objects; the final science is supposed to describe all 
possible aspects of the world, thus getting the picture of the world as it really is. In 
order to justify such a stance, one needs to adopt a Peircean position which assumes 
a linear progression in science, culminating in one - i.e., the final - theory. However, in 
our century uncertainty about the content of theories has grown fast, together with 
the feeling that there are alternative theories that can account equally well for all 
possible observations. Clearly the threat of relativism arises at this point, even though, 
nowadays, relativism no longer seems to be a threat, but just a fact of the matter.
Charles S. Peirce’s “long-run convergence” theory of scientific progress should thus 
be replaced by a more realistic position based on increasing success in scientific 
applications. But “perfection” (i.e.: the completion of the scientific project at large) 
looks, in principle, unfeasible. This means to oppose all those projects whose aim is 
the search for the “final theory”, a good case in question being that of the physicist 
Steven Weinberg.13 We can never assume that a particular scientific theory - for 
instance, Einstein’s relativity theory - gives us the true picture of reality, since we know 
perfectly well from the history of science that, in a future we cannot actually foresee, 
it will be replaced by another theory. And it should be noted, moreover, that this 
future theory will be better for future scientists, but not the best in absolute terms, 
since its final destiny is to be displaced by yet another theory.
Scientific realism must thus be strictly tied to the distinction between reality-as-such 
and reality-as-we-think-of-it. There is little justification for believing that our present-
day science describes the world as it really is, and this fact does not allow us to endorse 
an absolute and unconditioned scientic realism. In other words, if we claim that the 
theoretical entities of current science correctly pick up the structure of the world, 
we run into the inevitable risk of hypostatizing something - i.e., our present science - 
which is only an historically contingent product of humankind, valid in this particular 
period of its cultural evolution. But what about future science? We might in fact be 
tempted to say that, since present-day science is really bound to be imperfect and 
incomplete, perhaps future science will do the job, thus accomplishing that project 
of “perfected science”. Even in this case, however, many problems arise. First of all, 
13 See S. Weinberg, Dreams of a Final Theory, Pantheon Books, New York, 1992.
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just which future are we talking about? There is indeed no reason to believe that 
tomorrow’s science will be very different from ours as long as its capacity of providing 
the “correct” picture of reality is concerned. The fact is that scientific theories always 
have a finite lifespan. This is so for every human creation (and science is a human 
product, in any possible sense of the term).
Science, in sum, is not a stable system, but a dynamic process, and this fact leads us 
to view as problematic all those conceptions that place on the shoulders of future 
science the burden of perfection. Not even the fascinating theses of Charles S. Peirce 
escape this fate. According to Peirce’s “convergent approximationism”, the scientific 
results we are able to reach with the passing of time grow increasingly concordant, 
and the results consequently become less and less differentiated. Although such 
an optimistic picture cannot be rejected from a logical point of view, our historical 
experience, based on what the history of science teaches us, shows that the reverse is 
much more plausible. Ideal science, even when its realization is referred to the future, 
looks more a philosophical utopia than a feasible accomplishment (even though 
utopias are indeed useful when they are viewed as essentially “regulative” ideas).
This means, in turn, that our cognitive enterprise must be pursued in an imperfect 
world, and the strong realistic thesis that science faithfully describes the real world 
should be taken for what it is: A matter of intent. Instead of speaking of “science as 
such” (perhaps with a capital “S”), it is better to make our discourse more precise, 
dealing for instance with the science made by twentieth century scientists, or with the 
scientific conceptions held by scientists living in the seventeenth century, and so on.
On the other hand, the relations between commonsense claims and those made by 
science are rather complex, and we should get rid of the thesis that the scientific 
world-view is, in any possible meaning, better than that put forward by common 
sense. In particular, the exactness of technical scientific statements make them quite 
vulnerable while, in ordinary life, assertions are indeed vague, but on the other hand 
acquire security through inexactness. This situation can be explained well enough 
recalling that common sense has the fundamentally practical aim of providing the 
framework in which our daily life is to be conducted, and at this level we do not need 
great degrees of precision. Natural science’s aim, instead, is that of looking for maximal 
definiteness, and thus for maximal precision and testability. Doing so, the vulnerability 
of scientific statements becomes quite obvious: It is just the inevitable other side of 
the coin of definiteness.
Science and practice
Let us now go back to the claim that the commonsense view of the world is fated to be 
replaced by the scientific one. On what grounds can we claim the falsity of the manifest 
image? Clearly, we are allowed to make such a move only by adopting a teleological 
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view of science, i.e., by admitting the plausibility of a final theory. However it should 
also be noted that, in order to do that, we must take into account the manifest image 
as it looks like when we have a final science which can be presented as a real rival (as 
we said above, there is indeed no reason to believe that our actual scientific image is 
true). Since the present state of science is one of becoming, our actual science cannot 
have the force to replace common sense. It looks, in fact, absurd to compare the 
completed future science to the present manifest image. First of all, we do not know 
how this future science will look like, and, second, we cannot rule out the possibility 
that the manifest image develops even further, along with the scientific. It follows, 
then, that the second term of the comparison must be the scientific image “at the last 
possible stage”, because nothing else could do the job.
If, however, we ask in which context the principle that authorizes the abandonment of 
one scheme in favor of another is located, the answer is that it should be located in the 
context of common sense itself. Any attempt to refine - and make more precise - the 
commonsense conceptual scheme in which we think about the world is motivated, at 
least primarily, by the necessity to act on the kinds of knowledge such refinements can 
produce. And this, in turn, means that the aforementioned refinements aim at making 
the scheme more responsive to our practical needs. The view of science’s activity 
as postulating imperceptible entities to explain the behavior of the perceptible ones 
can be accomodated into this picture. For sure science began because of the need to 
explain, but this need is not an end in itself, since explanations are sought in order to 
grant the success of our practical endeavors.
So, not only does common sense produce the manifest image; it is also the framework 
in which science begins. Just in this sense, science is a part of the framework of 
common sense. Given the ineliminable practical side of our cognitive efforts, common 
sense would not initiate scientific inquiry without expecting to get something out of 
it, at least in the long run. Even common sense purports to answer the fundamental 
questions about the structure of the world, and it is likely to endorse whatever science 
has to say, once it is convinced that science can indeed answer the questions.
And this is the core of the problem, because common sense itself constantly undergoes 
the same sort of changes that characterize science. Common sense contains both 
beliefs and theories, which are constantly abandoned or developed and, if so, the 
image of the world that it generates must also change. There is indeed no reason to 
exclude that, if common sense is convinced of the value of specific scientific theories, 
it will adopt them. It follows that the acceptance of science is a common sense activity, 
and that the acceptance of the several scientific images of the world which evolve with 
the passing of time is a likely function of common sense, too. No doubt this entails a 
continuous refinement of the conceptual basis of common sense, a refinement which 
is detectable in our daily experience.
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Recall that, according to the supporters of the scientific image, the “true” image 
of the world is supposedly generated by the final theory, while there is no doubt 
that the manifest image is produced by common sense. The final theory, in turn, is 
fated to replace common sense by redefining the terms of our ordinary language, 
and replacing the rules of thought entrenched in common sense with theoretical 
correlates. However, if common sense need not be in conflict with science in the long 
run, such a theory is practically unattainable. If the acceptance of the products of 
science is a function of common sense principles, and if, furthermore, this acceptance 
is essential to our understanding of the role of science, it is misleading to conceive of 
the scientific image as replacing the manifest. Science is promoted by common sense 
given our constant need to know in order to act.
Even granting the possibility of a final theory, for it to replace common sense requires 
that it be rationally accepted or adopted. And what is the reason for adopting science? 
To answer that the final theory must be adopted because it explains means to give 
only a sufficient, but not a necessary condition. Knowledge, as we said before, is for 
the sake of action. If the final theory is adopted for the sake of action, it becomes part 
of common sense, which is totally different from replacing it. To resort to a paradox, 
we might even say that, in these circumstances, the scientific image becomes the 
manifest one. Common sense is, in sum, presupposed: If the possibility to build a final 
theory fated to replace common sense depends in turn on the possibility of its rational 
adoption, such a replacement is devoid of meaning. Common sense turns out to be 
anyway the engine of the whole operation, since it just uses the picture generated by 
science.
This should make us understand, in addition, that the concept of “manifest image” 
cannot be too precise. The manifest image is a function of common sense, and common 
sense is not a static, but rather a constantly changing body of beliefs and principles. 
Its core characteristic is provided by the set of principles which encourages new ideas. 
Just for this reason we are bound to conclude that the basic principles of common 
sense have a fundamental methodological hold on us. Undeniably the “completed” 
science is not an actual possibility but, rather, a regulative ideal. It works just as the 
concept of utopia in political philosophy: It may be very dangerous if we take it to be 
an actual possibility, and not a regulative ideal.
The importance of conceptual schemes
We have, thus, reasons for doubting that the fundamental principles of common 
sense can be replaced by a set of principles which can do a better job. In order to 
get this result, science should be conceived, once again, as progressing toward a 
unified completed stage in which it could take over from common sense, while the 
perceptible objects of daily life should be conceived of as not real. The abandonment 
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of the manifest image would follow as a logical consequence of this state of affairs 
and, perhaps, we should engage in a series of redefinitions using correspondence 
rules, a variety of which is already operative when, for example, we say that the table 
is really a collection of electrons.
The problem is that even microphysical particles, just like commonsense objects, are 
dependent on some kind of conceptual scheme. In a recent book Hilary Putnam replies 
to some arguments by Ian Hacking in the following way, commenting on Hacking’s 
famous statement concerning positrons, “If you can spray them, then they are real”:14
Now what does it mean to believe that “they” are “real”? If it means that one believes 
that there are distinct things called “positrons”, then we are in trouble - a lot of trouble 
- with the theory (...) I suspect that Hacking wants to say that here, in this experiment, 
positrons are “real” without saying what that means (...) I do not, of course, wish to 
say that positrons aren’t real. But believing that positrons are real has conceptual 
content only because we have a conceptual scheme - a very strange one, one which 
we don’t fully “understand”, but a successful one nonetheless - which enables us 
to know what to say about positrons, when we can picture them as objects we can 
spray and when we can’t. Hacking’s attempt to draw a sharp line between fact and 
theory (...) founders on precisely the interpenetration of fact and theory (...) the word 
“positron” isn’t a copy of a reality, but a “notation”, and it is the theory that instructs 
us in the use of the notation. Again the theory and the fact (positrons were sprayed) 
are not even notionally separable.15
We know that objects form the primary subjects of the framework of common 
sense, and the need to replace the manifest by the scientific image is justified by a 
principle which argues against ontological crowding, envisioning the elimination of 
a set of logical subjects in favor of another. But does such a principle make sense? 
One reason for endorsing this principle might be the fact that instrumentalists, for 
example, accept the manifest image as real, and view science as only a useful tool. 
However, it does not follow that this is the only way in which to deal with the manifest 
image. In other words, we cannot deny that commonsense objects are real because 
a philosophical trend we dislike accepts them. Recall that, according to Quine, we 
must resist the temptation to adopt an overcrowded ontology (an “overpopulated 
universe”16). But we would like to stress that the attempt to base ontology on a sort 
of linguistic/aesthetic preference looks unjustified: If reality were truly overcrowded 
from the ontological viewpoint, would it follow that we should give priority to our 
preferences rather than to the ontological structure of reality? Maybe Ockham’s razor, 
14 I. Hacking, Representing and Intervening, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, pp. 21-4.
15 H. Putnam, Pragmatism: An Open Question, Blackwell, Oxford-Cambridge (Mass.), 1995, pp. 59-61.
16 W.V. Quine, “On What There Is”, in From a Logical Point of View, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA)-London, 1980, p. 4.
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after all, is not such a good ontological criterion: Why should we decide to simplify, 
following our personal taste and opinions, a reality which is itself complex?
To assert that, because of certain biological characteristics which permit perception 
of objects of certain sizes and sounds within certain frequency, those features hold 
absolute primacy means to deny free range to our other faculties. But just as it 
would be absurd to say that the world of objects and processes falling within our 
perceptual range is all that is real, similar claims for the world of imperceptible 
entities are unreasonable. A large class of items get in touch with us in a perceptual 
manner, despite what else might be true of them. This is independent of the role 
of language, which is not to deny that language has an important role in helping us 
organize our response to the world. The conclusion to be drawn from these remarks 
is that, given certain facts about ourselves, and that we live in a world which looks, in 
an unreflective way, different from the world pictured by science - but nevertheless 
real - the arguments for ontological simplicity tend to oversimplify a very complicated 
situation. If we recall that the principles which give rise to science are principles of 
the framework of common sense, then perhaps with a little more reflection on the 
characteristics of common sense we might get a better result.
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